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Abstract
I argue for two claims: that the ordinary English truth predicate is a gradable
adjective and that truth is a property that comes in degrees. e rst is a semantic
claim, motivated by the linguistic evidence and the similarity of the truth predi-
cate’s behavior to other gradable terms. e second is a claim in natural language
metaphysics, motivated by interpreting the best semantic analysis of gradable
terms as applied to the truth predicate. In addition to providing arguments for
these two claims, I draw out consequences for debates about deationism and
truth-based analyses of notions such as assertion and logical consequence.
Keywords: truth, gradable adjectives, deationism, correspondence, semantics
1 Introduction
A core feature of deationary theories of truth – the kind of theory put forward by
Field [13], Horwich [18], ine [35], Ramsey [37], and perhaps Frege [14] – is that
they are theories of truth at both the linguistic and metaphysical level. According to
deationists, the behavior of the truth predicate reveals something interesting about
the truth property: either truth is not a property at all or, if it is a property, is thin,
insubstantive, or uninteresting one. e truth predicate is merely expressive, redun-
dant, eliminable, or purely logical (depending on the deationary theory on oer), and
there is no substantive property of truth. A common deationary strategy is to argue
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that because the truth predicate behaves as it does, the property of truth must be in-
substantive.1 Deationists move from an analysis of the truth predicate to conclusions
about the truth property.2
In this paper, I follow a similar strategy. I begin by analyzing the truth predicate
and then move to the metaphysics of truth. I argue that deationists and other truth
theorists have overlooked important linguistic behavior of the truth predicate which
suggest that it is a gradable adjective. I then argue that because the truth predicate is
a gradable adjective, the truth property is one that comes in degrees.
Oen, degree theories of truth have been motivated by the Sorites paradox and
vagueness.3 My degree theory is not a theory of vagueness. I will be seing aside
the issue of the Sorites, in the hopes that by rst developing a degree theory of truth
we can beer evaluate whether or not a degree theory can provide a solution to the
many problems of vagueness. My argument that truth comes in degrees is a pro-
posal in what is called natural language metaphysics. Natural language metaphysics
is a language-rst approach to metaphysics, oen in the context of formal semantic
theories.4 e natural language metaphysician identies interesting vocabulary in a
natural language – in my case, alethic vocabulary such as true and false in English
– and rst aempts to give a formal semantic theory for this vocabulary. She then
asks a question like the following question: Given the way people talk about, e.g.,
truth, what must truth be like? All of this presupposes that ordinary language can be
consistently formally analyzed and that natural language presupposes a conception
of the way the world is. e goal of the natural language metaphysician is to uncover
1As Lionel Shapiro puts it: “Deationists about truth argue that an appreciation of the expressive role
of the predicate ‘is true’ undercuts the demand for a metaphysically substantive account of the nature of
truth” [40, 320].
2Some deationists are only interested in the use of true in philosophical discussion, while other dea-
tionists are interested in both philosophical and ordinary uses of true. I am primarily interested in the laer
sort of deationist, and I assume throughout that the my dialectical opponents seek to capture ordinary
usage of the truth predicate.
3See Cleveland [7], Edgington [11], Sainsbury [38, Chapter 3], Smith [43], and Weatherson [44].
4For work in natural language metaphysics, see Bach [2], Davidson [10], Landman [25], Moltmann [32],
and Pelletier [33].
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this conception of the world via a formal analysis of natural language. Davidson, for
instance, posits the existence of events because such a posit allows us to explain the
entailment behavior or action sentences. I read Davidson as doing a kind of natural
language metaphysics: he began by analyzing action sentences in a formal frame-
work, and then he asked how the world needed to be in order for action sentences
to be true. His conclusion, of course, is that the world needs to include events. First
and foremost, I am interested in how speakers of English use true and what this tells
us about truth. In more functionalist terms, I rst ask how speakers of English use
the word true, and I then give a theory of truth that is consistent with this usage. My
central claim is that speakers of English speak as if truth comes in degrees.
Here’s the plan. In §2, I present evidence that true is a gradable adjective and
sketch a semantics for true following the inuential account due to Kennedy & Mc-
Nally [22, 23]. In §§3-4, I argue that deationary paraphrase strategies to get around
degrees of truth are unsuccessful. Speakers really do speak as if the property of truth
comes in degrees. In §5, I turn to the metaphysics. I argue that true denotes a property
that comes in degrees. But while the semantics does constrain the metaphysics, the
metaphysics is still underdetermined by the semantics. e semantics is compatible
with a variety of metaphysical theories of truth, including pluralist theories. In §6
I show how my degrees of truth theory interacts with the T-schema, assertion, and
logical consequence.
My view starts with the semantics, but it has consequences for several debates
about truth. If I am right, then deationary theories of truth are false. As we will
see, the deationist has no apparent way to explain the gradable behavior of the truth
predicate that does not rely on degrees of truth, as I argue in §3 and §4. So if deation-
ists intend their claims about true as descriptive claims about English, those claims
are wrong. e truth predicate is more semantically complex than the deationist can
allow. Further, if I am right, all theories of truth which claim that truth is an all-or-
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nothing property are false. Truth is a property that comes in degrees. I argue in §5
that some metaphysical theories of truth can be modied to accommodate degrees of
truth; it remains open whether all metaphysical theories of truth can do so.
2 True as a gradable adjective
On the standard analysis, predicates denote functions. On the deationary picture,
we can analyze the truth predicate as a function from sentences to truth-values. Let φ
be a variable for sentential expressions, and JφK be the set of worlds where φ is true.5
(3) JtrueKw = λφ.[JφK](w) = 1
Here we treat the truth-predicate as denoting a function from sentences to truth-
values, with sentences being treated as functions from worlds to truth-values. 6 While
strictly speaking such a lexical entry is neutral between a deationary and substantive
interpretation of truth, there is a natural reading of (3) that makes the truth predicate
appear redundant. On the deationary understanding, the truth predicate takes a
sentence as an argument and yields the value 1, true, if the world of evaluation is in the
set of worlds corresponding to the sentence’s semantic value and yields 0 otherwise.
Barring paradoxical sentences, the truth predicate returns 1 when a sentence is true
and 0 when a sentence is false. So truth seems redundant, as early deationists argued
[37]; saying ‘Snow is white’ is true says no more and no less than Snow is white.
is simple analysis is lacking. Deationists and other theorists of the truth pred-
icate have overlooked an important fact about the truth predicate: that it takes mod-
iers such as a lile and halfway and can appear in comparative constructions. We
5In general JK indicates the semantic value of an expression. Informally, semantic values are (i) truth-
conditions for sentences and (ii) truth-conditional contributions for subsentential expressions. I use lambda
expressions to represent the characteristic function of a predicate, following the notation and methods of
Heim & Kratzer [17].
6Because this is not a paper on the semantic paradoxes, I make the idealizing assumption that there are
no pathological sentences that would lead to paradox.
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will call this phenomenon gradable truth-talk. Some motivating examples are given
below.
(5) at is a bit true.
(6) What Paul said is a lile true.
(7) What Tom said was more true than what Jerry said.7
(8) Newtonian mechanics is less true than relativistic mechanics.
e observation here is that true by modiers such as a bit and lile as in (5)-(6),
and that it can appear in comparative constructions such as (7)-(8). is behavior is a
mystery if the semantic analyses above are taken as the proper lexical entries of the
English truth predicate. What does it means for a proposition, sentence, or theory to
to be very true if being true just means you have the semantic value of 1? Having that
semantic value is an all-or-nothing aair – yet it seems like we use true in such a way
that being true is not an all-or-nothing aair.
ese examples, however, may feel forced to philosophers’ ear. is in part due to
the fact that true is probably best viewed as a technical term in most of philosophy,
and in particular in logic. Given the theoretical role and technical denition of true
in these contexts, uses of true like (5)-(8) will always be infelicitous. However, I am
interested not in describing the use of true as it comes out of philosophers’ mouths. I
am giving a description of folk uses of true; this is in line with the project of giving
a natural language metaphysics of truth, and typically deationists – my dialectical
opponents in this paper – take themselves to be describing the folk notion of truth as
well.
It will be helpful, then, to look at some folk uses of true that are like (5)-(8). Here
are some examples, taken from prominent newspapers and online publications. Here
is one from e Sydney Morning Herald:
7I use the phrase more true, but one could also use truer.
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And while I’m a lile dubious about the reported suggestion that many
of the visitors were locals – if it’s even a lile true and Victorians have to
head to the 12 Apostles on Christmas Day to aempt to avoid crowds –
then even that underlines the problem. [34, emphasis added]
Here is another from e Washington Post:
We writers joke about how we haven’t goen anything done since Novem-
ber. But it’s sort of a dark joke because it’s a lile true. [36, emphasis
added]
is shows that at least a lile true is used in non-technical contexts.
Similarly, we nd examples of a bit true, more true, less true, and how true. Consider
this example, taken from e A.V. Club:
If that sounds like damning with faint praise, that’s a lile bit true. [41,
emphasis added]
Or this example from David Frum writing at e Atlantic:
e demand for universal health coverage might gain political force if so
many of the uninsured were not noncitizens and nonvoters. None of this
is immigrants’ fault, obviously. It is more true that Americas tendency to
plutocracy explains immigration policies than that immigration policies
explain the tendency to plutocracy. [15, emphasis]
Consider this example from an interview with Max Boot at e New Yorker :
e Reagan Administration actually did more to promote human rights
and made human rights a more central part of its foreign policy than most
U.S. Administrations of the last hundred years . . . It’s probably less true in
Africa, where I think the Reagan Administration made a major mistake in
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opposing sanctions on South Africa, because they insisted on doing that
through an exclusively Cold War prism. [6, emphasis added]
And nally, this example from e Guardian:
What separates a nation such as Britain from the barbarism of Isis, politi-
cians oen claim, is that Britain abides by the rule of law and is dened
by humane values. It’s in these hard cases that we will discover how true
that is. [29, emphasis added]
More examples can be found, but I take these to be representative examples. ey are
all recent, having been published in the last two years. Ordinary speakers of English
– including those writing in prominent publications – use expressions such as a lile
true, a bit true, and so on.8 So the truth predicate can be modied in ways that the
deationist does not allow. So what kind of predicate is true? I will now argue that
it is a gradable adjective. More specically, aer outlining the typology of gradable
adjectives I will argue that it is a totally closed gradable adjective.
2.1 Markers of gradability
Gradable adjectives such as tall, short, red, expensive, and so on, can be modied with
expressions such as very, not very, a lile, and especially; they can also appear in
comparative constructions.
(9) at boy is very tall.
(10) James is not very tall.
(11) My hair is a lile red.
(12) Jessie is taller than Kevin.
8Going forward, I will focus on constructed examples for ease of discussion. I include these examples
to provide more support for my claim that uses of true like (5)-(8) are felicitous in ordinary English.
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(13) Kevin is less tall than Jessie.9
It is a marker of being a gradable adjective that an expression can appear in these
sorts of contexts. We will now look at some of the other similarities between true and
gradable adjectives, e.g. red, tall, open, and so on.
So far, we have seen that true can be modied with expressions such as very and
a lile and can appear in comparative constructions. We repeat the examples here:
(5) at is very true.
(6) What Paul said is a lile true.
(7) What Tom said was more true than what Jerry said.
(8) Newtonian mechanics is less true than relativistic mechanics.
A similar paern holds for false.
(14) What John said is very false.
(15) e claims in that paper are absolutely false.
(16) Trump’s press release was less false than his tweet.
e parallel behavior of true and false is to be expected if true is a gradable adjective.
Gradable terms oen form antonym pairs. Consider tall/short, expensive/inexpensive,
empty/full, accurate/inaccurate, open/closed. (In the next section, we will see how the
standard analysis of gradable adjectives accounts for antonym pairs.) e truth pred-
icate has such an antonym: false. e claims I will make will be stated about true, but
everything I say can be applied to false with some minor modications.
e similarities between true and other gradable adjectives are sucient to justify
the assumption that I will make for the rest of this paper: that true is a gradable adjec-
9Alternatively, Kevin is not as tall as Jessie.
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tive. e rest of this section is focused on sketching the semantics for true, drawing
on the inuential proposal from Kennedy & McNally [22, 23].10
2.2 Degree semantics
ere are a number of semantic theories available for gradable adjectives. However,
the proposals that have proven the most popular in the literature have been degree-
theoretic.11 Gradable terms are terms which can be analyzed in terms of degrees on
scales and standards — intuitively, their corresponding properties are also the sorts
of things which can come in degrees. A person can be taller than another, i.e. can be
higher on the tall-scale. Similarly, one can be tall in context but not another, i.e. one’s
degree of tallness can meet or exceed the standard for tallness in one context but not
another. If true is a gradable adjective, then it is natural to take the property of truth
as something which can come in degrees as well.12
For the purposes of this paper, I assume a more-or-less standard, degree-theoretic
treatment of gradable adjectives as put forward by Kennedy & McNally [21, 22, 23].
While there are several proposals in the semantics of gradable adjectives, these typi-
cally dier in detail rather than spirit.
On the Kennedy & McNally semantics for gradable adjectives, adjectives such as
tall measure objects, or, as we will put it here, map objects to degrees.13 Importantly,
there are two relevant components to this mapping:
Scale: A set of ordered degrees, usually taken to be a set of degrees with at least a
partial order.14
10One might suspect that the examples above are contrived or somehow forced, perhaps suspecting the
presence linguistic coercion. Given the examples from various news sources above, I set this worry aside.
11See Kennedy [21] for arguments in favor of degree-theoretic accounts as compared to comparison class
accounts.
12See §5.
13Kennedy & McNally [22, 23], Lassiter [26], and Marzycki [30]).
14e scales usually have at least a partial order, but some orders weaker than partial orders are utilized
in the literature for some gradable adjectives.
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Dimension: e relevant feature of the objects to which the predicate applies which
the predicate measures, e.g. height for tall.
Antonym pairs dier only with respect to the ordering of degrees – if F and G com-
prise a gradable antonym pair, then their ordering of degrees is said to be inverted.
is inversion of scales, while holding the dimension xed, explains the following
phenomenon:
Antonym Inversion: If x is more F than y, then y is more G than x
Antonym Inversion holds for arbitrary antonym pairs such as tall/short and full/empty.
For instance, if John is taller than Mary, then Mary is shorter than John, and if glass
A is more full than glass B, then glass B is emptier than glass A. Similarly, if a truth-
bearer 〈p〉 is more true than a truth-bearer 〈q〉, then 〈q〉 is more false than 〈p〉. True
and false form an antonym pair.
2.3 Scales
Some scales have top or boom elements; some do not. Kennedy and McNally provide
a typology of gradable adjectives. ey write:
Scales that are open on the lower end include all of those degrees that
approach the limit of 0 but lack a degree whose value is less than that of
all the others in the set; scales that are closed on the lower end include
such a minimal value, equal to 0. Analogously, scales that are open on the
upper end include all of those degrees that approach the limit of 1 but lack
a degree that is greater than all the others in the set; those that are closed
on the upper end have a maximal degree whose value is 1. (Kennedy &
McNally [22, 354])
Determining where in the typology a particular gradable adjective falls depends on
the sorts of minimality and maximality modiers one can meaningfully apply to the
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adjective, e.g. completely, 100%, totally, absolutely, not at all, and so on. A totally
open gradable adjective lacks both a top and boom element. A lower closed grad-
able adjective lacks a top element but has a boom element. An upper closed gradable
adjective has a top element but lacks a boom element. A totally closed gradable ad-
jective has both a top and boom element. Some examples (from Kennedy & McNally
[22]):
Totally open: tall, short
Lower closed: bent, loud
Upper closed: quiet, pure
Totally closed: full, invisible
My contention is that true is a totally closed scale gradable adjective like full, empty,
open, closed, visible, and invisible. So I put forward a theory where the relevant scale
associated with JtrueK is one with a maximal element 1 and a minimal element 0,
corresponding to complete truth and complete falsity respectively. is is supported
by the grammaticality of the following:
(17) at snow is green is 100% false.
(18) What Eric said is totally true.
(19) Everything the Pope says is completely true.
(20) Aristotelian physics is not at all true.
Since these sorts of modiers are maximality and minimality modiers, it seems that
true has an associated scale with a top and boom element. us, true is a totally
closed gradable adjective.
11
2.4 Semantics for tall and true
According to my proposed analysis, true denotes a function from objects to degrees,
so a function of type 〈e, d〉. Call whatever these objects are ‘truth-bearers’ and these
degrees ‘degrees of truth.’ e truth-predicate, then, denotes a function from truth-
bearers to degrees of truth. We remain neutral as to what counts as a truth-bearer: ut-
terances, propositions, sentences, and beliefs should all be considered, and the present
analysis does not rely on identifying one primary class of truth-bearers.
Similarly, tall maps objects to degrees. Call these objects ‘height-bearers’ and
these degrees ‘degrees of height.’ Compare the lexical entries of tall and true in this
framework:
(21) JtallK = λx〈e,d〉.tall(x)
(22) JtrueK = λx〈e,d〉.true(x)
As it stands, entries (21)-(22) are not especially informative – they do not capture
the important dierences between tall and true. Importantly, tall and true dier in
two respects. First, the associated scales have dierent properties: the tall-scale is a
totally open scale, while the true-scale is a totally closed scale. Second, they vary in
their respective dimensions. e tall-dimension is plausibly height, while the true-
dimension is plausibly something like correct representation (more on this in §5). We
represent the functions by bolding the expression, the scale type by subscripting D,
and we say that the measure functions associated with tall and true are:
(23) tall = f : H ⊆ U → 〈D(0,1),≤, height〉
(24) true = f : R ⊆ U → 〈D[0,1],≤, truth〉
Here, H is the subset of members of U that have some height (the height-bearers),
and R is the subset of the members of U that are truth-apt (the truth-bearers).15 tall
15What that property is will be discussed in §5.
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maps those objects that have some height to a set of degreesD(0,1), which are ordered
via some ordering relation ≤, and it is said to measure them along some dimension
– in this case, height. true maps those objects which have some property to a set
of degrees D[0,1], ordered by ≤, and it is said to measure them along a dimension –
though what this dimension is will be discussed in §5.16
Kennedy & McNally assume that there is an implicit morpheme pos in the non-
graded uses of gradable adjectives, e.g. John is tall and at is true. It is pos that
supplies the contextually-determined standard for each gradable adjective in a con-
text. Following Kennedy & McNally [22] (with some minor modications), we get the
following semantic value for pos.17 Here G is a variable for predicates of type 〈e, d〉,
and c is a free variable for contexts.
(25) JposKc = λG.λx.∃d[standard(d)(G)(c)&G(x) ≥ d]18
It is pos that sets the standard, but what is the standard for a bare truth-ascription?
Typically, it would seem that for some truth-bearer to be counted as just plain true,
it must be absolutely true. at is, true is an absolute gradable adjective rather than
a relative gradable adjective – relative gradable adjectives being adjectives where the
standard does not default to the top element — for instance, a party can be quiet
without being maximally quiet, as standards of quietness vary across contexts. A
truth-bearer is true just when it is absolutely true (typically); similarly, a surface is
at just when it is absolutely at (typically). And this is to be expected — as Kennedy
& McNally [22, §4.1] conjecture, all totally closed gradable adjectives are absolute
adjectives. e truth predicate behaves just as expected when analyzed as a totally
closed gradable adjective.19
16For now I label the dimension as ‘truth’ but this should be seen as just a placeholder for sketching the
semantics.
17Kennedy [21] remains neutral on whether there is a constituent pos at the level of syntax or if there is
a pos-type-liing operation for the positive form of gradable adjectives. I write as if pos is a constituent for
simplicity.
18Here I follow the Kennedy & McNally presentation of pos, but I note that Kennedy [21] gives a similar
semantics without existentially quantifying over d.
19We will see in §3 that this is essential in arguing against a deationary interpretation of the data.
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Here is a statement of the truth-conditions of an arbitrary bare truth-ascription
〈p〉 is true:
(26) J〈p〉 is trueKc,w = 1 i
∃d(standard(d)(JtrueK)(c)&JtrueK(〈p〉) ≥ d) at w
Informally: the bare truth-ascription 〈p〉 is true is true in a context c i there is a
contextually-determined standard for truth d and 〈p〉 meets or exceeds d. (26) is the
result of JposK taking JtallK as an argument, by means of the rule Function Applica-
tion.20
is provides a succint explanation of bare truth-ascriptions. A bare truth-ascription
is true i the truth-bearer to which truth is ascribed meets or exceeds a conversa-
tional standard for whatever the truth-dimension is. A standard is set by the context
through the free variable c in JposK.21 Since true is a totally closed gradable adjective,
the standard defaults to 1, the maximum element on the scale. But we can allow for
lax contexts where a truth-bearer need not meet such a high standard – all that is
required is that we assume the default is 1.
Given the Kennedy & McNally analysis of modiers and comparatives, we can see
why it is that true is able to take the modiers that it does, e.g. mostly, a lile, and so
on. We will call these gradable truth-ascriptions. Recall:
(5) at is mostly true.
(7) What Tom said is more true than what Jerry said.
(14) What John said is very false.
We now need to show how true interacts with these modiers in a compositional
fashion. Given standard entries for mostly and more than (see Kennedy & McNally
20Function Application is familiar to all working in generative linguistics, as it is a standard composi-
tional rule from Heim & Kratzer [17]. For clarity I provide a statement of the rule here: If α is a branching
node with β and γ as daughters, and JβK ∈ JγK, then JαK = JγK(JβK).
21On my view, true is a context-sensitive expression. However, the semantics I propose is very dierent
from contextualists about truth, e.g. Burge [4, 5] and Simmons [42].
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[22]), we can give the following truth-conditions for two paradigmatic gradable truth-
ascriptions, 〈p〉 is mostly true and 〈p〉 is more true than 〈q〉. Here, read St as the scale
of truth, i.e. [0, 1].
(27) J〈p〉is mostly trueKc,w = 1 i
∃d(di(max(St), d) < di(d)(min(St)) ∧ JtrueK(〈p〉) = d)) at w
(28) J〈p〉is more true than〈q〉Kc,w = 1 i
∃d1∃d2(d1 > d2 ∧ JtrueK(〈p〉) = d1 ∧ JtrueK(〈q〉) = d2) at w
Intuitively, 〈p〉 is mostly true is true just when the dierence between the highest
degree d which 〈p〉 meets in the context and the maximum element of the scale of
truth St is less than the dierence between d and the minimum element of St. More
simply, 〈p〉 is mostly true is true just when 〈p〉 is more true than false. And intuitively,
〈p〉 is more true than 〈q〉 is true just when the highest degree of truth that 〈p〉 meets
is higher than the highest degree of truth that 〈q〉 meets.
e best argument for the truth predicate being a gradable adjective comes in two
stages. During the rst stage, one would argue that true behaves similarly to gradable
adjectives such as tall and at. I have argued that this is so, by pointing to the fact that
true takes modiers such as very and not at all, and that true can appear in compar-
ative constructions. During the second stage, one would show how the semantics of
the truth predicate could be given using the machinery already employed in the anal-
ysis of gradable adjectives. I have argued that this is so, using the semantics given
by Kennedy & McNally. We can explain both bare and gradable truth-ascriptions in
a straightforward way. So while my conclusion about the truth predicate may seem
unorthodox, it is in an important sense conservative – we take on no new commit-
ments about how we should analyze gradable terms, for instance, and we can help
ourselves to the machinery of standard model-theoretic semantics. us, I conclude
that the truth predicate is indeed a gradable adjective.
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We have the outlines of a plausible semantic theory for true, where true is analyzed
as a totally closed gradable adjective. But there are two issues remaining. First, can
the proponent of a deationary theory of truth oer an interpretation of the data
that does not involve the thesis that truth comes in degrees? In §§3-4, I argue that
this is not the case; deationism cannot accommodate gradable truth-talk. Second,
what is the relevant dimension of a truth-bearer that the truth predicate measures to
determine a truth-bearer’s degree of truth? In §5, I present some options.
3 Expressivism about true
Deationists about truth will want to resist the proposed analysis. It is easy to see why
this is so: if true is best analyzed in degree-theoretic terms, then it would seem that
truth is a property that comes in degrees. On deationary accounts of truth instances
of (T) – or other similar schemata – exhaust our theory of truth:
(T): 〈p〉 is true i p
If this is so, it is hard to see how truth could come in degrees.
To my knowledge, few deationists have argued against degree-theoretic approaches
to truth and the truth predicate. Horwich [18, §28] is a notable exception.22 Horwich’s
strategy is a variant of what I will call expressivism about true. According to expres-
sivism about truth, the gradable uses of true should not be taken to reveal anything
about the more complex mechanisms of the truth predicate – that is, they should not
be taken to reveal that true is a gradable adjective – and thus the natural language
22Paul Egré has pointed out to me that Haack [16] also argues against degrees of truth from a deationary
perspective. Haack is particularly interested in what Ramsey’s deationary theory might say about degrees
of truth. Her conclusion is negative: if deationism is true, then truth does not come in degrees. (Further,
talk of degrees of truth is, for Haack, meaningless.) I focus on Horwich’s argument over Haack’s for two
reasons. First, Horwich aempts to accommodate talk of degrees of truth; I will argue that his aempt is
unsuccessful. Haack instead challenges the meaningfulness of gradable truth-talk. Given my arguments
in §2, I feel comfortable assuming for the rest of this paper that sentences such as at is half true and
What Terry said is more true than what Kelly said are meaningful. Second, I agree with Haack’s conditional.
Haack, channeling Ramsey, argues that if deationism of true, then truth does not come in degrees. I argue
for the contrapositive: since truth comes in degrees, deationism must be false.
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metaphysics about truth is not degree-theoretic. Instead, expressions such as very
true are used to express credences or degrees of belief. For a shorthand, we will say
that gradable truth-talk expresses condence.
Expressivism about true is an aractive position, as it seems to accord with speaker
phenomenology. When pressed to specify what they mean, speakers suggest that
they use expressions such as very true to express condence, or to suggest that they
will ‘stand by’ what was said. e exact mechanism of this expression – that is, a
specication of how gradable truth-talk plays this emotive function – is beside the
point for our purposes.
According to Horwich’s version of expressivism, there is an epistemic notion re-
lated to truth: determinate truth and determinate falsity [18, §28]. A sentence of the
form ‘x is F ’ is determinately true i ‘x is F ’ is true and there is no semantic obstacle
to determining whether or not x is F . ‘x is F ’ is determinately false i ‘x is F ’ is false
and there is no semantic obstacle to determining that x is not F . For Horwich, deter-
mining is an epistemic notion, and a semantic obstacle is a feature of the meaning of
the predicate is F that makes it cognitively impossible for speakers to determine the
precise extension of the predicate.23
ere is still the maer of what to say about expressions such as e Pope only
speaks the absolute truth, What Bill said is a lile true, and Relativistic mechanics is
more true than Newtonian mechanics. is is not a maer of semantic ignorance, or a
maer of determining the extension of vague predicates, so the distinction between
truth and determinate truth is not yet helpful in providing an adequate paraphrase.
But Horwich invokes another epistemic notion: degrees of belief (or, equivalently,
credences). Take any formalism which assigns more than the standard truth values
0 (falsity) and 1 (truth), for instance a degree theory which takes the range of truth
values to be the real numbers [0,1], and so appears to be assigning degrees of truth to
23ese features are tied up in Horwich’s use theory of meaning [19], in particular gappy paerns of
predicate application that make it impossible to determine precise extensions despite all predicates having
precise extensions.
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sentences, propositions, or other truth-bearers. Horwich interprets this formalism as
follows: 0 is determinate falsehood, 1 is determinate truth, and any value n between
0 and 1 is the degree of condence that the relevant proposition is true [18, 83-84].
Building o of Horwich’s proposal, we can say that expressions like very true or a lile
true serve as inexact expressions to indicate some salient range of credences, and that
comparative constructions such as Relativistic mechanics is more true than Newtonian
mechanics can be paraphrased as assigning a higher credence to relativistic mechanics
than Newtonian mechanics.
With this rough and ready conception of expressivism about truth, I turn to raising
two objections to the proposal in §3.1. In §3.2, I show how my account explains the
apparently expressive uses of gradable truth-talk. So instead of treating the main
expressivist insight as an objection, I argue that it is in fact a feature of my view.
3.1 Objections to expressivism about true
ere are two main objections to expressivism about true. First, it is ad hoc and un-
systematic. at is, it fails to generalize to other similar expressions. Since we are
engaged in the project of giving a semantics for true, we need to give a similar seman-
tics to similarly behaving expressions. Second, it fails to capture the intuitive meaning
of comparative constructions, e.g. Relativistic mechanics is more true than Newtonian
mechanics.
We can see that this strategy is ad hoc and unsystematic by considering more
standard gradable adjectives such as tall and closed. When we assign a degree of
tallness in our semantics for tall, it is clearly not an assignment of credence level to
the proposition that, say, Arthur is tall. Similarly, when we say that the door is fully
closed, it does not mean that the door is determinately closed.24 at gradable talk
isn’t interpreted as credences in the case of other adjectives suggests that gradable
talk shouldn’t be interpreted as credences in the case of true. Parity demands that we
24is is the epistemic sense of determinately.
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treat like cases alike. e expressivist will need to claim that all gradable talk is to be
interpreted as assignments of probabilities or as expression of condences. But this
is problematic for two reasons. First, assigning a high credence to the proposition
that John is tall is a dierent maer from saying that John is very tall – we can see
this because it is felicitous to say that John is very tall only if one knows that John
is tall simpliciter, but one can assign a high credence to the proposition that John
is tall without knowing that John is tall. And second, we have an elegant semantic
theory that makes sense of gradable adjectives without paraphrasing into assignments
of credences – so there is no need to paraphrase the relevant locutions into talk of
credences.
A response that might arise in this context goes like this. As deationists have
long contended, true is a very special predicate – it is sometimes said to be merely
expressive, purely logical, in principle dispensable, and so on. And so a commied
deationist will not be convinced by any of the arguments I have given above, be-
cause these arguments rely on treating true as a predicate much like green and heavy
– predicates that are not merely logical, merely expressive, or dispensable. e ex-
pressivist about true could likewise contend that this is the case: true is special, and
so gradable truth-talk is special. But the claim that true is special insofar as it merely
expressive or a logical device is itself an empirical claim, relying on the actual behav-
ior of the truth predicate in English. If deationists or expressivists want to claim that
true is merely expressive as an argument against my proposal, they will then need to
show how the arguments for treating true as a gradable adjective are unsuccessful.
And they will need to show this without presuming that true is a special predicate
that cannot or should not be given an ordinary semantic analysis.
Implicit in this response is the assumption that deationists are interested in giv-
ing a descriptive theory. I think in the case of many deationists, this is certainly the
case. Some deationists [39] explicitly do not seek to give a descriptive theory of the
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English true. My response is only directed at the descriptive deationist; the revision-
ary deationist is not concerned with our ordinary talk, and so would not need to give
a paraphrase of gradable truth-talk in the rst place.
Second, the expressivist paraphrase fails to capture the intuitive meaning of com-
paratives. Recall the example Relativistic mechanics is more true than Newtonian me-
chanics. Uered by, say, a physics professor to an introductory physics class, this
just doesn’t seem like an expression of comparative credences. It is more natural to
interpret what the physics professor says in terms of degrees of truth: Relativistic me-
chanics describes the world more accurately than Newtonian mechanics. And while
recognizing that one theory describes the world more accurately than another will
oen be accompanied by an assignment of higher credences to the rst theory, that
does not establish that what is meant by the comparison is an expression of those
credences.
is point can be strengthened by considering two theories which are known to be
false. Since the relevant agents know them to be false, the theories are both assigned a
credence of 0. If the expressivist treatment of gradable truth-talk is correct, then these
theories are thereby equally true insofar as both are absolutely false. Yet, this does
not seem right. One theory may be more true than other in virtue of beer describing
the world — despite both theories being false and known to be false, one may be more
true than the other. Our uses of graded instances of true do not seem to reduce to
expression of credences.
3.2 Absolute standards
I have given two objections to expressivism about truth. ere still remains the issue
of how to explain the intuition that very true and other instances of gradable truth-
talk are oen used to express condence. It is my contention that the degree-theoretic
account is not challenged by this intuition. In fact, given some plausible pragmatic
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assumptions, my acccount predicts this phenomenon.
On my account, true is a totally closed gradable adjective. On the Kennedy & Mc-
Nally analysis – which I follow – being an absolute gradable adjective is correlated
with having an absolute standard as the default. In ordinary contexts, the standard
of truth is the maximum element on the scale: 1. So strictly speaking, on my account
many of the uses of modiers, especially in constructions such as at is very true,
are redundant. e feeling that very and really are used to express condence is ex-
plainable with some plausible pragmatic assumptions: given that very is redundant
in at is very true, cooperative speakers will only use it when they want to express
something more than the literal semantic content of the uerance. It is plausible that
speakers intend to express degrees of condence in many cases. So the motivating
insight of expressivism about true is not a criticism of my account, as my account
explains it.
3.3 Probabilities and degrees of truth
Another aractive paraphrase of gradable truth-talk – related to expressivism, but dis-
tinct – is in terms of probabilities. at is, perhaps a truth-bearer is very true when
(i) it is true and (ii) the probability that it is true is very high. is is distinct from the
view that gradable truth-talk can be paraphrased in terms of credences unless we as-
sume that probabilities are subjective and are thus analyzable in terms of credences.25
On this view, a sentence such as What Mary said is a lile true isn’t taken to be ex-
pressing a state of low condence in what Mary said, but rather is paraphrased as
something like What Mary said is a lile likely.
Paraphrasing gradable truth-talk into probabilities is signicantly less plausible
than paraphasing it into credences. It lacks the intuitiveness of the expressivist para-
phrases I have discussed above, and it cannot make sense of sentences such as What
Mary said is absolutely true, though it is unlikely. Consider the case of a loery with
25See Hajek [20, §3.3] for discussion.
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1,000 tickets. Suppose now that the winning ticket, #42, has been drawn and placed
into an envelope. Nobody has seen the winning ticket. It is absolutely true that #42 is
the winning ticket, but given anyone’s evidence, it is exceedingly unlikely. Assuming
it is a fair loery, the probability is .001%. So it seems that probablities and degrees
of truth come apart.
Notice that assertions of sentences such as What Mary said is absolutely true,
though it is unlikely seem Moore-paradoxical. One explanation would be to assume
that they are Moore-paradoxical because they are straightforwardly contradictory,
amounting to saying that what Mary said is both likely and unlikely. But this is too
strong: the sentences would just be contradictory, not Moore-paradoxical. Another
explanation – the one I endorse – is that the sentence is true but unassertable, given
plausible constraints on assertion, e.g. that one only asserts a sentence if it is at least
prey likely. Since the rst conjunct of What Mary said is absolutely true, though
it is unlikely is said to be unlikely by the second conjunct, the conjunction should
be unassertable. So according to my view, the sentence is odd not because degrees
of truth are probabilities, but rather because of the link between probabilities and
assertion. is properly captures the Moore-paradoxicality of the assertion without
claiming that the sentences are self-contradictory.
4 Degrees of non-alethic properties?
My account explains the motivating insight for expressivism about true, and it does
so without positing that the truth predicate is special or peculiar – that is, a stan-
dard semantics for predicates that behave like true in English, taken together with
some pragmatic principles, explains why speakers feel as if some gradable truth-talk
is merely expressive. is makes the semantic proposal more plausible, and it shows
that a deationary account of gradable truth-talk is at best unmotivated. But I moved
from the semantic level to the metaphysical level, claiming that the property of truth
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comes in degrees. Another worry – and another way for the deationist to resist the
substantive metaphysics of truth I will propose – is to claim the modiers like a lit-
tle and comparatives such as more . . . than do not modify true in instances of what
I called gradable truth-talk, but rather modify other non-alethic predicates. On this
view, gradable truth-talk is used to generalize over degrees of other properties. is
seems reasonable enough, given the intuitive pull of the following:
(Very-T:) 〈x is F 〉 is very true i x is very F
Filling in ‘snow’ and ‘white’ for ‘x’ and ‘F ’ makes the pull a bit stronger. For instance,
〈Snow is white 〉 is very true, it would seem, i snow is very white.26 On this proposal,
gradable truth-talk is in a sense illusory. Similar stories would need to be told for all
the modiers the truth predicate takes, but it easy to see how the story would go.
Brandom [3, 164], for instance, endorses this sort of paraphrase for locutions such
as at snow is white is probably true, where we paraphrase this as Probably, snow is
white.27
is line of thought might provide deationists with a way of avoiding my anti-
deationary conclusions. If modiers such as very were only supercially modifying
the truth predicate, then no degrees of truth would be needed in our semantics. So
speakers of English would not be speaking as if truth comes in degrees.
ere are three major problems for this view.
First, the move of pushing the degrees from truth to other properties lacks plausi-
bility when it comes to comparative constructions, as there are no other predicates in
these constructions. Relativistic mechanics is more true than Newtonian mechanics is a
paradigm case of gradable truth-talk, and yet it is unclear what property that relativis-
tic mechanics has to a greater degree than Newtonian mechanics, other than perhaps
some representational property that could come in degrees, such as correspondence
26Similar points could be made about a lile true and more or less true.
27We note that in (Very-T) the modier very is modifying a predicate rather than the whole sentence,
unlike probably in Brandom’s example.
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(see in §5). But to admit this is to admit that it is truth that comes in degrees, and so
this fails as a paraphrase into something non-alethic.
We could posit that implicit in these comparative constructions are non-truth
predicates – perhaps in the case of Relativistic mechanics is more true than Newto-
nian mechanics, predicates concerning support by the available evidence, or predic-
tive power. e particular predicates do not maer — what would maer is if these
predicates are really there in those constructions. I do not rule them out on the ba-
sis that they are implicit or unvocalized; my account of truth-ascriptions relies on
positing an implicit morpheme pos. However, we posit pos because of the theoretical
work it does for us in giving a semantics for gradable terms, not because we wish to
avoid unwanted metaphysical conclusions. e status of these posits is importantly
dierent.
Second, parity considerations support treating truth as the property that is said
to come in degrees in these gradable constructions. When someone uers e door is
almost closed, paraphrasing the expression so that it isn’t the property of being closed
that is had to a high degree seems unnatural. Similarly for Bill is a lile tall. An
assertion of that sentence is analyzed as saying that Bill has the property of being
tall to a fairly low degree. en why is it that What Bill said is a lile true is to be
interpreted so that the property of being true doesn’t come in degrees? If we want to
give a uniform interpretation of the semantics, then we should treat true as a gradable
adjective denoting a property that comes in degrees.
It is certainly not the case that the presence of occasional, scaershot expressions
with modiers such as very F and a lile F are sucient to establish that F is a gradable
adjective. With this observation in mind, a reader may object along the following
lines. Some predicates, they will rightly note, are not gradable but can be coerced.
Consider an expression such as very pregnant; we can imagine contexts in which a
speaker could uer very pregnant and it would be perfectly intelligible. For instance,
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if Sally and Jane are both pregnant, but Sally is only a month or so along and Jane
is near the end of the third trimester, a speaker may say Sally is pregnant, but Jane is
very pregnant. Here the meaning of pregnant is coerced into something like far along
in a pregnancy, which is related but distinct to the meaning of pregnant. e objector
may believe that something like that is going on in the case of true. If that is so, then
the deationist wouldn’t need to supply a ‘hidden’ predicate that is being modied
— they may simply claim that in a particular context, the meaning of true is coerced
into something distinct yet related to the ordinary meaning of the term.28
Paul Egré [12] has recently begun exploring the applicability of degree-theoretic
notions of truth to vagueness and the paradoxes, and he too is concerned with the
linguistic evidence for the gradability of true. Egré notes, and I agree, that coerced
predicates tend to be ‘marked’, and that this marking is one of our best ways of de-
termining whether or not a predicate is being coerced in a particular context. One
way that these predicates are marked is by stress or emphasis — so, for instance, a
speaker might say that Jane is very pregnant rather than simply saying that Jane is
very pregnant. Vocal stress or emphasis is a contextual clue that the relevant predicate
needs to be interpreted in a non-standard way. In writing, this is oen represented
with italics. Here I must report that gradable uses of the truth predicate do not seem
to require this kind of marking; when one hears these expressions in ordinary dis-
course, they are not accompanied with stress or emphasis in any systematic way that
would indicate widespread coercion. In my examples found in publications such as
e Washington Post and e Guardian, neither the modiers nor the predicate were
stressed. is suggests that speakers of English are comfortable using gradable truth-
talk without indicating that the meaning of the truth predicate needs to be coerced
into something non-alethic.
It is helpful to take a step back from the dialectic and consider what, exactly, it
would take to establish that the truth predicate is a gradable adjective. We cannot
28Something like this may underlie the claims of expressivists about true. See the discussion in §3.
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insist on conclusive evidence or only deductive arguments for the conclusion, because
conclusive evidence and deductive arguments are rarely available for the kinds of
empirical claims that one nds in linguistic semantics. Instead, we must be content
with hypotheses which oer the best account of the linguistic data. I contend that
my hypothesis – that the truth predicate is a totally closed gradable adjective – oers
such an account. It explains the felicity of expressions such as:
(6) What Paul said is a lile true.
(8) Newtonian mechanics is less true than relativistic mechanics.
(15) e claims in that paper are absolutely false.
Further, because I do not make any claims about linguistic coercion, my account also
explains the lack of marking by way of vocal stress, emphasis, or italics in ordinary
speech. And it does all of this explanatory work within the framework of a standard
semantics for gradable adjectives, with no theoretical innovations required.
ird, in a case such as instances of (Very-T), the transformation from an alethic
claim to a non-alethic claim (and vice versa) seems natural. Yet it does not seem
natural in all cases. Consider the following context. John and Bill are both tall. We
can stipulate that both exceed the minimum standard of tallness by a good amount.
We also stipulate that John is taller than Bill. Is it now the case that 〈 John is tall 〉
is more true than than 〈 Bill is tall 〉? To my ear, this seems wrong. Since John and
Bill are both tall – they both exceed the standard of tallness in the context – it is true
simpliciter than John is tall and true simpliciter that Bill is tall. Both are perfectly
true. So we have a case where degrees of tallness and degrees of truth come apart.
is suggests that a linguistic theory of tall and true needs to be sensitive to the fact
that the degrees of tallness in a context will not fully determine the degrees of truth
of the relevant proposition in that context, which suggests that degrees of truth are
in some sense independent of degrees of non-alethic properties. Determining the
26
exact relationship between degrees of truth and degrees of non-alethic properties is
important work, and in the next section I turn to the metaphysics of truth. It seems
natural that we would need a metaphysical story about the relationship between truth
and the world in order to fully capture the relationship between degrees of truth and
degrees of non-alethic properties; I suggest that the former cannot simply be reduced
to the laer.
5 Truth as a gradable property
e deationary interpretation of gradability seems implausible. Yet we need an ac-
count of truth that does justice to the predicate’s behavior. I believe there are a number
of plausible candidate properties — for instance, many of the properties traditionally
considered in the truth literature or in more recent pluralist debates.29 In general, the
degree theory I have oered puts only a few constraints on what counts as a truth
property. I list these constraints:
Maximality: e property is such that there is such a thing as being maximally true,
corresponding to having the degree 1.
Minimality: e property is such that there is such a thing as being maximally false,
corresponding to having the degree 0.
Degrees: e property is such that there a truth-bearer can have more or less of it.
Now I turn to some candidate truth properties. We will see that the constraints im-
posed by the semantics underdetermine what the right truth property is. is is a
welcome result; it would be theoretically inappropriate if the semantics I favored com-
pletely seled the maer of what truth is, even when we restrict ourselves to natural
language metaphysics.
29For a sampling see Wright [45] and Lynch [28].
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e properties I will consider here are truth properties that allow for one truth-
bearer to have more of the property than another truth-bearer. ese are not proper-
ties of the degrees employed in the semantic formalism. A metaphysics of mathemati-
cal degrees is a separate maer from a metaphysics of the dimension that is measured
in the gradable expression true. true denotes a function that maps objects to degrees
along a dimension, and I am asking what that dimension could be. ere is a separate
issue of the ontological status of degrees employed in semantic formalisms, and I am
not concerned with that issue here.
5.1 Correspondence
Representational properties are the sorts of properties that come in degrees. For in-
stance, let’s say that for a truth-bearer to correspond to the world is for that truth-
bearer to resemble the world, in the same way that for a mental representation to
represent an object is for it to resemble that object. It is clear that objects can be mul-
tiply represented, and that of two particular representations R1 and R2 of an object
O, it can be truly said in some instances thatR1 resemblesO to a greater degree than
R2, or that R1 slightly resembles O while R2 greatly resembles O. e resemblance
relation comes in degrees.
Traditional correspondence theories claim that truth is a relation between truth-
bearers and objects in the world (typically states of aairs or facts, though sometimes
objects).30 is relation is one much like resemblance (though nothing I say hangs
on the relation between a proposition and a state of aairs being exactly like the re-
lationship between a mental representation and objects in the world). While those
correspondence theorists oen take this relation to be an all-or-nothing maer, this
isn’t forced on us by the nature of the relation. Just note the list of candidate cor-
respondence relations given by David [9]: correspondence, conformity, congruence,
agreement, accordance, copying, picturing, signication, representation, reference,
30See Künne [24] for discussion.
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and satisfaction. All of these candidate relations seem like the sorts of relations that
can come in degrees: it seems possible to partly correspond, conform, be congru-
ent, agree, accord, copy, picture, represent, and satisfy. And if any of these are the
correspondence relation in the correct correspondence theory of truth, then corre-
spondence seems like the sort of relation that comes in degrees.
is metaphysics in fact seems most naturally suited to a gradable view of truth.
e hard part for a metaphysics of truth that invokes representational properties such
as resemblance or picturing (e.g.) is guring out how a proposition could ever fully
resemble or picture a state of aairs such that it is absolutely true. On this picture,
absolute truth is the special case. is suggests a stronger claim than the one I have
made so far. I have argued that if truth comes in degrees, then the correspondence
theory of truth is very aractive. But I also endorse the other direction: If one is a
correspondence theorist, then one should accept that truth comes in degrees. ese
two view pair well to form a plausible view of truth that does justice to the linguistic
evidence.
5.2 Anti-realism and pluralism
Suppose one is loathe to be a correspondence theorist, or does not think that one
can just be a correspondence theorist, e.g. Lynch [28]. One wants to opt for, say,
a vericationist, coherentist, or pragmatist view of truth either globally (such that
it is the right view of truth for all propositions) or locally, perhaps by partitioning
propositions into domains. Can one accept that ‘is true’ is a gradable adjective and
that truth is a property that comes in degrees? I will argue here in the armative.
e pragmatist conception of truth, where truth is taken to be the expected util-
ity of adopting a belief, is easily recongured to accommodate degrees of truth. For
instance, for a belief to be very true just is for the expected utility of that belief to
be very high. For a belief to be a lile true is for there to be some, but not much,
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expected utility if one adopted the belief. And comparative judgments are easily seen
as comparisons of expected utility. e pragmatist needs to make sense of the lim-
iting cases of full truth and full falsity. For the former, we can say that full truth is
maximum utility or, more clearly, the belief that is fully true in some context is the
belief whose adoption has the highest expected utility among the range of the salient
options. us the pragmatist can make sense of full truth without positing something
like absolute utility. It would seem plausible that full falsity would just be having the
expected utility of 0. is does not work, given that in an unfortunate case the best
option might be the belief whose adoption has the utility of 0; in such a case, that
belief would be fully true and fully false, which is absurd. Being fully false should
rather be regarded as having the lowest expected utility of the available options.
Now consider coherence and vericationist theories of truth. A coherence theory
of truth will need to show how there is such a thing as partial coherence, or nd a
way to make sense of one set of sentences or propositions having more coherence
than some other set. And to give a proper reduction, the notion of a degree of coher-
ence will need to be explicated in terms of something non-alethic. If these desiderata
are met, then the coherence theorist could adopt my semantics. Similarly for verica-
tionist theories of truth. If there is some sense to be made of partial verication, or of
verication in degrees, and verication can be made sense of in terms of something
non-alethic, then the vericationist can adopt my semantics.31
Let’s assume that the notions of partial coherence and partial verication can be
explicated suciently.32 en the semantics I have proposed does not force on us a
particular metaphysics of truth, and in fact might not force on us a monist view of
truth. A pluralist, provided they had an account of context’s eect on the truth pred-
icate, could hold that in dierent contexts or in dierent domains the truth predicate
31One option, following Ayer’s strong/weak verication distinction [1], is to claim that partial veri-
cation amounts to rendering a proposition probable. Since probability comes in degrees, we can say a
proposition is more veried if it is rendered more probable by the evidence.
32See Moltmann [31] and Yablo [46] for steps in that direction.
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picks out dierent properties (as long as those properties come in degrees).
We have seen that there are a variety of metaphysical options available to a grad-
able view of truth. In this paper, I do not take a stand on what the best option is,
and I leave eshing out the metaphysics for future work. What has been established
by my arguments is that whatever property true picks out must be one that comes
in degrees, that this property must be substantive rather than deationary, and that
several properties may t the bill. is leaves open the questions of the particulars
of the metaphysics of truth, but this is a desired result. While the semantics of true
might constrain the metaphysics, it would be surprising if the semantics of true fully
determined a particular metaphysical theory. Choosing between the available options
is, again, le for future work.
6 eT-Schema, Assertion, andLogical Consequence
By puing forward the view that truth comes in degrees, I am challenging a central
assumption not just in theories of truth, but in many other domains, e.g. logic and
philosophy of language. But it is my contention that my theory is conservative in the
following sense: it is compatible with many of our ordinary philosophical analyses of
truth-related notions. I will briey try to show this. I will also note, in §6.3, where my
theory may lead to interesting avenues of future research.
Before going forward, I will introduce a terminological shorthand: being true
enough. A proposition or other truth-bearer 〈p〉 is true enough in a context i its
truth value meets or exceeds the conversational standard in that context. Since true is
an absolute gradable adjective, the standard is usually absolute truth – for a proposi-
tion to be true enough in c, where c is a normal context, the proposition’s truth-value
must be at least 1 in the context. However, there may be strange, looser contexts
where we gradual lower the standards of truth. (is would be an imprecise context,
perhaps. Similar imprecise contexts can be constructed for at or invisible.) But 〈p〉
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will be true enough in that context i the proposition’s truth-value meets or exceeds
the conversational standard for truth in that context. e notion of being true enough
will prove useful for the rest of this section.33
6.1 T-schema
Deationists and substantivists alike emphasize the importance of the following schema:
(T): 〈p〉 is true i p
On a deationary account (T) need not be explained. It is fundamental to the concept
of truth. On substantive accounts, (T) is taken at least as a test of theoretical adequacy
– this is why, e.g., Lynch [28] aempts to derive (T) from more basic principles about
truth (what he calls platitudes). But my account seems not to guarantee the truth (T).
If (T) is fundamental to our concept of truth, then this is a serious problem. I will
quickly show that my theory guarantees the truth of various instances of (T), once it
is suciently enriched.
Currently (T) makes no mention of contexts, but I hold that the truth predicate is
context-sensitive and degree-theoretic. So our explanation of (T)will require mention
of contexts and degrees. Suppose in some context c, the standard of truth is d (usually
d = 1, but we do not need to assume this for now). e righthand side of (T) holds i
the degree of truth of ‘p’ meets or exceeds d — that is, if ‘p’ is true enough. Assume
that in this context, this is the case. en ‘p’ is true in the context. e lehand side of
(T) is a truth-ascription. But on my view, a truth-ascription is true i the truth-bearer
meets or exceeds the conversational standard of truth d. So the lehand side of (T) is
true in a context just when the righthand side of (T) is true in that context. When ‘p’
is true enough in a context, so is ‘〈p〉 is true’ (and vice versa).
33Lewis [27] introduces a similar notion of being true enough. ere is one salient dierence, which
we can ignore for now: Lewis’ discussion of being true arises in his discussion of vagueness, and Lewis
analyzes vagueness in terms of ranges of precisications. By using the terminology, I do not wish to commit
myself to this analysis of vagueness.
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e explanation of (T) on this view is straightforward – it only requires a reason-
able claim about when a truth-bearer is true in a context and when a truth-ascription
to that truth-bearer is true in that context. And it is my claim that they are true under
precisely the same conditions: when the truth-bearer meets or exceeds the conversa-
tional standard of truth d.
6.2 Assertion
One intuitive idea about assertion is that assertion is a speech act that presents a
proposition to other speakers as true. Crispin Wright [45, 34] takes the following to
be one of the core platitudes about truth and assertion:
Assertion: To assert 〈p〉 is to present 〈p〉 as true.34
is is a more-or-less Fregean account of assertion, where one of the dening charac-
teristics of assertion is its relation to the truth. e case of (T), (Assertion) makes no
mention of degrees, and so our analysis of assertion will need to be modied slightly.
With our notion of being true enough in hand, we can reformulate Assertion as
follows:
Gradable Assertion: To assert that 〈p〉 in c is to present 〈p〉 as true enough in c.
us, the degree theory is compatible with an intuitive view of assertion, with some
minor modications. If there is an important connection between truth and assertion
and truth comes in degrees, then Gradable Assertion should seem highly intuitive.
If the standards for truth can shi in various conversational contexts, then so should
the standards for assertion. Aer all, if truth is a norm of assertion, or if something
like Assertion seems to be constitutive of assertion, then if truth comes in degrees
our analysis of assertion should change accordingly.
34Wright does not use the bracket notation to indicate the presentation of propositions or other truth-
bearers, instead speaking elliptically as “To assert is to present as true.” I modify the presentation slightly
for the purposes of this paper.
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6.3 Logical consequence
Finally, I turn to logical consequence. Since truth is a maer of degree, it would seem
that the natural view is that logical consequence will be fuzzy. Indeed, this has been
the strategy of many degree theorists, who have pursued various many-valued logics,
as in Zadeh [47]. But, as many object, endorsing a many-valued logic has severe costs,
such as the loss of some treasured classical operational and structural rules. Not all
fuzzy logics validate modus ponens; some do not validate contraction. is raises an
important question: is my degree theory incompatible with classical logic?
ere is certainly an inconsistency with my degree theory and the following plat-
itude about logical consequence:
Consequence: A is a consequence of a set of premises P i in all cases where every
member of P is true, A is true.
Since Consequence makes no mention of degrees of truth, it is hard to see how
it could be consistent. We could aempt to reformulate Consequence as we did
Assertion, resulting in:
Gradable Consequence: A is a consequence of a set of premises P i in all cases
where every member of P is true enough given the contextually-supplied stan-
dard of truth in the context, A is true enough given that standard.
However, there are reasons to believe that such a formulation would only succeed in
recapturing classical logic in limited circumstances.
When we take the standard of truth to be 1 for both the premises and the conclu-
sion, we can then introduce the notion of a threshold value. A threshold value is some
degree d (what we have called a conversational standard throughout), and we dene
a corresponding function Fd s.t. Fd(x) = 1 if d ≤ x and Fd(x) = 0 if x < d. On the
assumption that 0 and 1 are ordered in the usual way, this maps our innite degrees of
truth to a two-element Boolean structure. We can then treat our Boolean operations
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as is standard. By assuming that the threshold value is 1, we may recapture classical
logic.
is is a very weak claim. In essence, it amounts to saying that a degree theory of
truth is compatible with classical logic just when that degree theory acts as if there
are no degrees of truth. is simple recapture strategy does not necessarily extend to
cases where the standard for truth is less than 1. In order to capture the classical con-
sequence relation in a more satisfying way, one may need to consider using dierent
standards of truth for the premises and the conclusions of arguments.35
Due to considerations of space and scope, I cannot solve this particular problem in
this particular paper. Instead, I leave this as an open question. Given the degree theory
of truth that I propose here, what is the correct treatment of logical consequence? It
may be that we can fully recapture classical logic in all contexts. For many this would
be a welcome result. But it may be that utilizing degrees of truth in the way that I have
described opens up a new sort of logical pluralism, where the consequence relation
in a context is determined by the standard of truth in that context.36 is is le as an
avenue for future research.
7 Conclusion
I have argued for three claims. One, the truth predicate is a gradable adjective, not a
context-insensitive predicate as is typically assumed. Two, the best semantic analy-
sis of gradable adjectives is degree theoretic, and so the best natural language meta-
physics of truth is one where truth comes in degrees. ree, deationary or expres-
sivist paraphrases of gradable truth-talk are insucient. I have also tried to draw out
the consequences of my degree theory for the T-Schema, assertion, and logical conse-
quence. ere remain a number of outstanding philosophical issues, e.g. the semantic
35is is the strategy taken by Cobreros et al [8] and Smith [43].
36I thank Paul Egré for suggestions and comments on this section of the paper in particular.
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paradoxes, vagueness, and logical pluralism. I leave applying the degree theory of
truth to these issues for future work.37
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